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Income Replacement and Reemployment Programs in Michigan and Neighboring States
Stephen A. Woodbury
October 2002
Governments in every developed industrial economy administer programs that partially
replace the earnings of workers who suffer job loss or on-the-job injury. In addition, governments
administer programs to help job losers gain reemployment, either through direct job placement
(for those who are job-ready) or through retraining (for those who are not).
This chapter describes and discusses current policy issues surrounding the main social
insurance and reemployment programs in Michigan: Unemployment Insurance (UI), which
partially replaces lost earnings following loss of a job; Workers' Compensation (WC), which
pays for medical treatment, vocational rehabilitation, and lost earnings following a work-related
injury or illness; and the cluster of reemployment and training programs that, since 1998, has
come under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). In addition to describing these programs, a
main goal of the chapter is to offer a critical view of Michigan's programs by comparing them
with corresponding programs in neighboring states.
Discussion of these three programs could hardly be more timely. UI has come under
attack for a range of alleged failings, and the Michigan legislature passed a bill in April 2002 that
increased weekly benefits, lengthened benefit durations, and tightened the eligibility requirements
for UI in Michigan. Also, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 has resulted in significant
changes in reemployment services nationwide as well as in Michigan, and there is continuing
debate over the effectiveness of the “work first” approach that WIA entails. Finally, WC has
gone through cycles in which dramatic cost increases have been followed by efforts at cost
containment. Michigan's WC law has seen only minor changes during the last 20 years because
reforms instituted in the early 1980s appear to have kept both medical and wage replacement
costs of WC in Michigan in line with those in other states. However, health care costs are
1

projected to resume their growth in the near future, which would directly affect WC costs and
put increased pressure on the WC system.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (UI)
Since 1936, UI has paid weekly benefits for a limited period of time to workers who have
lost their job through no fault of their own and are actively seeking work. The UI system was
established by the Social Security Act of 1935 as a federal-state system; that is, each state
administers its own UI program, setting its own benefit levels and tax rates subject only to broad
federal guidelines and oversight by the U.S. Department of Labor. Since April, 2002, UI has been
administered in Michigan by the Bureau of Unemployment & Workers' Compensation (under
the Department of Consumer and Industry Services), which consolidates two former agencies:
the Unemployment Agency and the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation.
Although UI is taken for granted as an economic institution, its objectives have been
debated and its effectiveness and operations criticized almost continuously from its beginnings.
As Haber and Murray (1966, p. xix) noted, “Labor criticizes the program as inadequate.
Management is also critical, observing that many laws are too loose in their eligibility and
disqualification provisions.” It is no different today. In March 2002, the National Employment
Law Project (NELP) criticized UI as "rife with shortcomings and inequities," the most important
of which "involves the difficulty many workers face in even qualifying for benefits" (Emsellem et
al. 2002). On the other hand, Strategic Services on Unemployment and Workers' Compensation
(widely known as UWC, a business membership and advocacy group) submitted Congressional
testimony in June 2002 stating that "Employers who actively manage their UI liabilities see UI
overpayments and fraud as a serious problem..." (Oxfeld 2000).
This section attempts to sort out these claims and counterclaims by describing first the
2

eligibility requirements and benefit levels of Michigan's UI program, and then the financing of the
program. Policy issues are discussed in turn, and comparisons are drawn to neighboring states.
The discussion provides a background for examining the current controversy over goals of the UI
system—that is, whether it should serve mainly as an income replacement program for workers
with a strong attachment to the labor force, or whether it should play a more aggressive role in
fighting poverty by transferring income from higher-wage to lower-wage workers.
Eligibility and Benefits
To be eligible for UI benefits in any state, an unemployed worker must satisfy two broad
sets of criteria. The first are referred to as "monetary eligibility" criteria and pertain to a worker's
earnings history. The second are "nonmonetary eligibility" criteria and pertain to the conditions
that led a claimant to leave the last employer and whether the claimant is now looking for work.1
Monetary eligibility and weekly benefits. In Michigan, as in other states, a worker's
monetary eligibility is based on earnings in a so-called "base period," which is conventionally
defined as the first four of the five completed quarters before the claim is filed. The quarter of the
base period in which earnings were highest is referred to as the "high quarter." To be eligible for
benefits in Michigan, a worker must have high-quarter earnings of at least $2,146 and total baseperiod earnings at least 1.5 times high-quarter earnings (or at least $3,219).
For workers who meet these criteria, the weekly benefit amount is calculated as 4.1
percent of high-quarter earnings, up to a maximum of $362 per week. For example, a worker with
high-quarter earnings of $2,146 (and base period earnings at least $3,219) would receive the
minimum weekly benefit of $88. A worker with high-quarter earnings of $8,829 or more (and
base period earnings at least $13,244) would receive the maximum of $362. (Before changes in the
Michigan UI law that were passed in April 2002, the maximum weekly benefit amount was
1

Details can be found at the Michigan Bureau of Workers' & Unemployment Compensation website
<www.michigan.gov/bwuc>. I am grateful to Robin Norton of the Bureau for clarifying several points. Useful
general references on UI include Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1994, 1995, 1996), Blaustein
(1993), and O'Leary and Wandner (1997). See also U.S. Department of Labor (2002a) and UWC (2002).
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$300.)
This basic method of calculating weekly benefits—that is, multiplying high-quarter
earnings (or earnings in the two highest quarters) by some factor—is used by all but 9 states.
Note that Michigan's 4.1 percent factor results in a weekly benefit slightly greater than 50
percent of average high-quarter earnings. [Multiplying high-quarter earnings by 1/26 (3.85
percent) would yield a replacement rate of exactly 50 percent because a quarter has 13 weeks.]
Workers with dependents receive a "dependents' allowance" of $6 per dependent (for up
to 5 dependents, or $30) per week. However, the $362 maximum cannot be exceeded, so the
dependents' allowance increases the weekly benefit only of workers who are below this
maximum. Michigan is one of 12 states that has a dependents' allowance.
In Michigan, the minimum potential duration of benefits is 15.5 weeks (14 weeks before
April 2002), and the maximum is 26 weeks. Within these bounds, potential benefit duration is
determined by the following formula: Multiply total base-period earnings by a factor (43 percent
in Michigan's case) and divide the result by the weekly benefit amount. For a worker who barely
qualifies for benefits, this calculation yields a potential benefit duration of 15.5 weeks (0.43 ×
$3,219 / $88 = 15.7, which is rounded down to the nearest half-week). For a worker who just
qualifies for the maximum weekly benefit, this calculation also yields a benefit duration of 15.5
weeks (0.43 × $13,244 / $362 = 15.7, again rounded down).
This rather arcane formula for potential duration of benefits does have a rationale. The
idea is that the potential duration of benefits should be greater for workers whose earnings are
more stable, as measured by the ratio of base-period earnings to high-quarter earnings. For a
worker with the same earnings in all four base-period quarters, this ratio is 4; for a worker with
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highly variable earnings, the ratio could be as low as 1.2
Under these monetary eligibility criteria and benefit levels, a worker earning the minimum
wage of $5.15 for 417 hours in one quarter (that is, full-time for about 11 weeks) and for 209
hours in any other base-period quarter (that is, full-time for about 5 weeks) would be eligible for
the minimum weekly benefit of $88 for 15.5 weeks, or up to $1,364. That is, earnings of $3,219
during 16 weeks of employment would yield benefits totaling as much as $1,364 over a 15.5week spell of unemployment.
How does a relatively high-wage worker fare under the program? A worker earning an
hourly wage of $17.31 for 40 hours a week over 32 weeks would be eligible for the maximum
weekly benefit of $362 for 26 weeks. That is, earnings of $22,157 over 32 weeks of employment
would yield benefits totaling as much as $9,912 over a 26-week spell of unemployment. (This
example is chosen to show the lowest wage rate and hours worked that would yield the maximum
benefit amount and maximum duration of benefits.)
Table 1 summarizes several aspects of UI benefits in Michigan and neighboring states.
Michigan's minimum weekly benefit amount is somewhat higher than in neighboring states, but
the base period earnings required to qualify for those benefits are also higher. (For Michigan, the
figures in parentheses show the increases that took effect following the April 2002 amendments
to the Michigan UI law.)
Before April 2002, Michigan's maximum weekly benefit amount was the lowest in the
region; it now exceeds Indiana's and Wisconsin's, and is in the midrange of Illinois's and Ohio's
2

To see this, write the potential duration formula stated in the text as follows:
Dpot = min [aBPE/WBA; 26],
where a denotes the factor by which base-period earnings are multiplied (0.43 in Michigan's case), BPE denotes
base-period earnings, and WBA denotes the weekly benefit amount. Next, recall that BPE depends on high-quarter
earnings (HQE):
WBA = bHQE,
where b is the factor by which HQE is multiplied to give the weekly benefit (0.041 for Michigan). Substituting this
latter into the potential duration equation gives:
Dpot = min [aBPE/bHQE; 26],
which makes clear the relationship between the potential duration of benefits and the ratio of BPE to HQE.
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maxima (these ranges exist because Illinois and Ohio have dependents allowances, which vary
with the number of dependents and can increase the maximum). The base-period earnings
required to qualify for the maximum benefit in Michigan are somewhat higher (post-April 2002)
than in Ohio and Wisconsin, but considerably lower than in Illinois and Indiana. Note that Illinois
is the only "uniform duration" state in the region—any worker who qualifies for benefits in
Illinois is potentially eligible for up to 26 weeks of benefits.
Whereas the first six rows of Table 1 summarize statutory UI benefit provisions, the
lower seven rows show data on UI benefits actually paid. Michigan's average weekly benefit
amount was lower than that in Illinois but similar to that in the other states shown. However,
Michigan's average weekly replacement rate—the ratio of average weekly UI benefits to average
weekly earnings—was the lowest in the region. This occurred both because Michigan's maximum
weekly benefit amount was the lowest in the region and because wages are higher in Michigan
than in any neighboring state except Illinois.
Thirty-four states, including Illinois and Ohio, automatically adjust the maximum benefit
amount by linking it to the state's average weekly wage. A typical approach is to set the
maximum at between 50 and 60 percent of the average weekly wage. (Illinois, for example, sets it
at 50 percent.) By adopting such an approach, Michigan could prevent UI replacement rates
from slipping well below those in neighboring states, as they did before the April 2002
amendments. The practice could also avoid repeated political wrangling over the maximum benefit
amount, as occurred in early 2002.
Both the average benefits per unemployment spell and the average duration of benefit
spells are similar in Michigan and three of its neighboring states; the exception is Illinois, where
the 26-week uniform duration of benefits leads to relatively high benefits per spell and spell
durations. About 28 percent of UI recipients in Michigan exhausted their benefits in early
6

2002—higher than in Wisconsin, similar to Ohio, and well below Illinois and Indiana. (In Illinois,
relatively high weekly benefits combine with long potential durations and what appears to be
relatively lax enforcement of the work search test to give a relatively high exhaustion rate.)
Exhaustion rates have sometimes been used as a very rough gauge of the adequacy of the
potential duration of benefits.
Finally, Michigan's UI recipiency rate—the percentage of unemployed workers receiving
UI benefits—was over 57 percent in early 2002, well above the national average of 48 percent
and higher than most of the states neighboring Michigan. The determinants of UI recipiency are
only partially understood (Vroman 2001), but Michigan's relatively high rate is usually attributed
to the relatively high proportion of workers who are union members and consequently receive
assistance in claiming UI benefits. The number of workers receiving UI varies greatly over the
business cycle—in 1999, only 323,015 Michigan workers received UI (a 10-year low), whereas
by 2001, the number had jumped to 513,277.
Alternative methods of qualifying. Although clear from an administrative standpoint,
the monetary eligibility criteria described above can create much confusion. The definition of the
base period is a key problem. For example, for a claim filed on June 29, 2003, the base period
would be the four calendar quarters of 2002 (because the second quarter of 2003 is not yet
complete). For a claim filed two days later, on July 1, 2003, the base period would be the last
three quarters of 2002 plus the first quarter of 2003. Accordingly, there is always a lag (often
considerable) between the base period and the timing of a UI claim, and this lag can result in
apparent inequities. For example, a former welfare recipient who started a job in April, 2001, was
laid off in the wake of September 11, 2001, and claimed benefits sometime before September 30,
2001, would have a base period that included the last three quarters of 2000 and the first quarter
of 2001. None of her roughly 6 months of earnings would be included in that base period, and she
7

would be ineligible for UI benefits. Only by waiting until January 1, 2002, would she have two
quarters of earnings in a conventionally defined base period and (potentially) satisfy the
monetary eligibility criteria for UI.
To mitigate the delays that arise under the conventional base period, many states
(including Michigan) define an "alternative base period," which may be used to make benefits
available to workers who would otherwise be ineligible. Michigan's alternative base period is the
last four completed quarters before the claim is filed (rather than the first four of the last five
completed quarters). This works to the advantage of workers like the former welfare recipient
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Under the alternative base period, the worker would have
a base period that included all of her roughly six months of earnings (April through September) as
of October 1, 2001, and could start receiving benefits. (For a detailed treatment of the alternative
base period, see Vroman 1995.)
Before 2000, Michigan had no need for an alternative base period because the base period
was defined as the 52 weeks immediately preceding the UI claim. Under this old system, the UI
agency needed first to ask a UI claimant to list his or her employers from the year before the
claim and then to contact each of these employers to request a weekly earnings history of the
worker. This "wage request" system was cumbersome and time-consuming, although it allowed
Michigan to avoid the lag problem discussed above.
In 2000, Michigan moved to the existing "wage records" system, under which every
covered employer in Michigan files a quarterly report (usually digital) stating the wages paid to
every worker employed during that quarter. The advantage of the wage records system is that
when a worker claims UI benefits, the Bureau of Unemployment & Workers' Compensation
simply accesses preexisting wage records to determine the worker's monetary eligibility and
benefit amount. (The system also allows the Bureau to determine the worker's employers during
8

the base period so that benefits paid can be appropriately "charged" to employers—see below.)
The disadvantage of the wage records system, however, is that a lag inevitably exists between the
end of a quarter and the time at which the wage records are available to the Bureau. This lag is the
main reason for defining the conventional base period as the first four of the last five completed
quarters—it allows a full quarter (which, given existing technology, seems unnecessarily long) for
employers to report and for the Bureau to upload the reports.3
Michigan has still another formula for qualifying for benefits—the "alternative earnings
qualifier" (AEQ). Under the AEQ, a worker is eligible for benefits if he or she has wages in 2
base-period quarters and total base-period wages at least 20 times the state average weekly wage
($714 in 2002, so that a worker needs base-period earnings of at least $14,289.20). The AEQ
works to the advantage of seasonal workers who, like construction workers, may have quite high
earnings in one quarter but relatively low earnings in other quarters, so that their total base-period
earnings fall below 1.5 times high-quarter earnings. Weekly benefits and maximum durations are
determined as under the regular formula (that is, using high-quarter earnings).
Nonmonetary eligibility. To be eligible for UI benefits, a worker must also satisfy three
sets of "nonmonetary" criteria. First, a worker must have left his or her last job due to lack of
work and through no fault of his or her own (these are known as "separation criteria").
Accordingly, a worker who quits voluntarily or is discharged for cause is ineligible for UI.
Second, a worker must be currently available for and seeking full-time work (these are known as
"nonseparation criteria" or the "UI work test"). Accordingly, a worker who is unavailable for fulltime work due to child care responsibilities, who decides not to search for work because he or she
believes jobs are unavailable, or who takes a vacation, is ineligible for UI. Third, a worker must
not be receiving "disqualifying income," the definition of which varies from state to state.
3

The move to wage records was motivated by a 1984 federal law mandating that all states require employers to
make quarterly wage reports to a state agency. Michigan was the last state to comply fully with this law, and did
not do so until October 1, 2000.
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The nonmonetary eligibility criteria appear straightforward, but they are difficult to
implement and enforce. Consider first the separation criteria. Should all base-period separations
be considered in applying the separation criteria, or only the most recent? Michigan considers all
base-period separations, and several states—including Illinois and Ohio—consider separations in
addition to the most recent under some circumstances (see Table 2). What reasons should be
included as "good causes" for quitting a job voluntarily? In Michigan, as in most states, good
cause is restricted to issues directly related to work or the employer, but two additional reasons
are allowed in Michigan—leaving an unsuitable job within 60 days and leaving a job to accept
another job that does not materialize. Some states include additional reasons; for example, leaving
a job due to sexual harassment is considered good cause in eight states, including Illinois and
Wisconsin, but not Michigan. As is suggested by Table 2 ("additional reasons allowed"),
Michigan is somewhat less permissive than neighboring states, particularly Wisconsin, in
allowing additional "good causes" (for details, see UWC 2002).
In Michigan, a claimant who quits voluntarily or is discharged for cause cannot receive UI
benefits for the duration of the current unemployment spell. In order to requalify, a worker who
quits voluntarily must earn 12 times his or her weekly benefit amount, and a worker who is
discharged must earn 17 times his or her weekly benefit amount. (Before the April 2002 changes
in Michigan's UI law, such workers needed to earn only seven times the weekly benefit amount
to requalify.) For example, a worker who is ineligible because he quit a previous job would need
to find a new job, earn at least 12 times his weekly benefit amount, and then be laid off for lack of
work before he would be eligible for UI. If he earned less than 12 times his weekly benefit
amount before the layoff, he would still be ineligible. As can be seen in Table 2, Michigan's
disqualification provisions resemble those of neighboring states.
Consider next the nonseparation criteria. For most workers, satisfying the nonseparation
10

criteria entails registering with Michigan Works! (which administers the public labor exchange in
Michigan—see below), being available for "suitable" work, and actively searching for full-time
work. Registering with Michigan Works! is unambiguous, but suitable work can be variously
defined. Michigan's law defines suitable work as a job that pays 70 percent or more of the gross
pay rate received on the pre-layoff job. (Michigan also defines suitable work as work previously
performed or for which the worker is trained.) A worker who refuses to apply for or accept such
work can be denied benefits. (Before April 2002, suitable work was defined in relation to a
claimant's duration of unemployment. For the first 12 weeks of unemployment, a job was
suitable if it paid 80 percent or more of the pre-layoff rate; for the next eight weeks, 75 percent
of the pre-layoff rate; and thereafter, 70 percent of the pre-layoff rate.) A worker who refuses
suitable work is now disqualified from receiving benefits for 13 weeks (formerly 6 weeks).
Most states are less specific than Michigan in defining "suitable" work; indeed, most
simply state that a worker must be available to accept work, which is likely to exclude more
workers from eligibility. As Table 2 shows, among neighboring states, only Ohio specifies that
UI claimants must be available for "suitable" work.
The requirement to seek full-time work has been controversial because of its implications
for the eligibility of part-time workers. For example, a worker who worked 30 hours a week over
a period of years and was laid off would very likely be monetarily eligible for UI. Such a worker
would have a strong attachment to the labor force by most reasonable definitions, but unless that
worker were seeking full-time employment (meaning employment of at least 35 hours per week),
she would not satisfy the nonseparation criteria for eligibility. This problem has led some
observers to conclude that the UI system is outmoded, in that it suits the needs only of
traditional full-time workers and fails to take account of the needs of single household heads with
childcare responsibilities. For example, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation
11

(1995) recommended that workers who satisfy a state's monetary eligibility criteria should not be
denied benefits solely because they are seeking part-time work. Sixteen states have modified their
eligibility requirements along these lines (U.S. Department of Labor 2002a); however, Michigan
has not made such a change, and neither has any neighboring state (see Table 2).
Finally, Michigan reduces the weekly benefit amount by the amount of any disqualifying
income, which includes severance pay, salary continuation, back pay, wages in lieu of notice,
vacation and holiday pay, and pension income received from a base-period employer. Michigan
tightened its disqualifying income provisions in the 2002 changes to its UI law; it did not
consider severance pay to be disqualifying income before the changes. Some states consider WC
to be disqualifying income, but Michigan does not. Supplemental Unemployment Benefits
(SUB), which are important in Michigan because they are paid to many laid-off auto workers by
their employers under UAW contract, are not considered disqualifying income in Michigan. (This
is similar to the treatment of SUB in other states.) Although Michigan's disqualifying income
provisions are generally similar to those in other states, UI agencies throughout the country
complain that these provisions are difficult to administer and enforce because they generally
depend on the worker reporting the income. As a result, they appear to be a frequent source of
payment errors (Woodbury 2002b).
Specific policy issues. Two further issues regarding UI benefits have long been
important and have recently caused controversy: the waiting week and extended benefits.
During the debate over amending Michigan's UI law in early 2002, consideration was
given to requiring a waiting week; that is, a one-week period at the beginning of a claim during
which an eligible claimant does not receive benefits. Michigan is the largest of the 12 states that
currently does not have a waiting week (U.S. Department of Labor 2002a). Wisconsin, like
Michigan, does not have a waiting week; Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio do. Ultimately, the Michigan
12

legislature did not adopt a waiting week in 2002.
The argument against a waiting week is simply that it delays the receipt of benefits by
workers. However, at least two arguments have been made in its favor. First, some researchers
have argued that short spells of unemployment tend to be overcompensated, whereas long spells
tend to be undercompensated (Davidson and Woodbury 1997; O'Leary 1998). If so, then
imposing a waiting week could improve the efficiency of the UI program if the savings resulting
from the waiting week allowed the potential duration of benefits to be extended. (It is worth
noting, however, that such an extension was not discussed during the debate over the Michigan
UI law in 2002.) Second, in insurance terms, the waiting week acts as a deductible and reduces the
moral hazard associated with a form of insurance that may be abused. For example, in the absence
of a waiting week, a construction worker can maintain a UI claim and reopen that claim for short
periods of time—even for a day. If bad weather prevents work on a construction job, the worker
receives UI benefits for that day. Few would argue that UI is intended to compensate spells of
nonwork that (like those resulting from bad weather in construction) are regular and can be
expected.4 (For further discussion of the waiting week, see Woodbury and Rubin 1997, pp.
220–222.)
As discussed above, Michigan's UI program provides up to 26 weeks of benefits to
eligible claimants. These "regular state" benefits are the first tier of the program and are financed
entirely from payroll taxes collected from Michigan employers (see below). In 1970, Congress
enacted the Extended Unemployment Compensation Act, which is intended to extend the
duration of benefits by 50 percent (up to 13 weeks) automatically for workers who have
exhausted their regular benefits in states where the labor market has deteriorated as a result of
recession. This program, which is widely called "standby Extended Benefits" (or simply "EB"),
4

Imposing a waiting week would be expected to lead to wage increases for construction workers so that ultimately,
the full cost of employing construction workers would be borne by those who hire construction workers, rather than
being shifted to others. As discussed below, the tax that finances UI is only partially experience rated, so that the
construction industry pays less into the UI system than its workers receive in UI benefits.
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can be thought of as a second tier of the UI program. Unlike regular state benefits, EB is funded
half by state UI payroll taxes and half by the federal UI payroll tax (again, see below).
During the recession of 1990–91, standby EB activated in only 10 states (one of which
was Michigan), and several states that were hard-hit by the recession never triggered onto EB
(notably California, New York, and Pennsylvania). Similarly, during the recession and slowdown
of 2001–02, standby EB has activated in only 4 states (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington).
The reason is that Congress revised the triggers that activate EB in 1981, making it much harder
for the program to activate. To a large extent, EB has become inactive.
As a result, Congress authorized "emergency" extended benefits during the period from
1991 to 1994, and did so again in March 2002. Such "emergency" benefits can be thought of as a
third tier of the program, funded wholly from federal revenues. In most states (including
Michigan), the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 2002 (TEUC)
extends the potential duration of benefits by 50 percent (up to 13 weeks) for unemployed
workers who filed an initial claim for UI after March 10, 2001, and have exhausted their regular
state benefits. TEUC benefits are payable from March 16 through December 28, 2002. (An
additional 13 weeks of TEUC benefits are available in states where the insured unemployment
rate reaches 4 percent. This has occurred only in Alaska, Oregon, and Washington.)5
Although extended benefits have been a federal prerogative, extended benefits policy is
nevertheless important to the states. In particular, the state UI agencies must set up and
administer emergency extensions on very short notice, which is costly and difficult. (State
agencies are well-prepared to manage extensions under standby EB, but the form of emergency
extensions cannot be known until Congress passes the emergency legislation.) More important,
perhaps, is that federal policy—both standby EB and the succession of emergency
extensions—reflects and has created an apparent consensus that 26 weeks of benefits are
5

For further discussion of extended benefits, see Woodbury and Rubin 1997, pp. 250-271.
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adequate during economic expansions. In 1971, nine states provided more than 26 weeks of
regular benefits (Michigan was not among these), but the number has dwindled steadily since
(Blaustein 1993, pp. 303–306), so that only two now provide more than 26 weeks of regular
benefits (Massachusetts and Washington State, which both provide up to 30).
Financing UI
In Michigan, as in nearly every other state, UI is financed by a payroll tax that is
collected entirely from employers.6 This UI payroll tax is essential to the federal role in the UI
system. The Social Security Act provides for a payroll tax (the Federal Unemployment Tax),
which is currently 6.2 percent of the first $7,000 of a worker's earnings in a calendar year.
However, employers in states with a federally approved UI program (that is, one that meets the
broad guidelines stated in the Act) are credited 5.4 percent and as a result pay only a 0.8 percent
Federal payroll tax. This is the incentive whereby the Federal government induced all the states
to adopt a UI program (see, for example, Blaustein 1993, Chapter 6, for a discussion).
In Michigan, virtually all employers are required to pay the UI payroll tax. Aside from
agricultural and domestic employers, any employer who has one or more workers in any 20
weeks of a calendar year, or who has payroll of $1,000 or more in a calendar year, is a "liable
employer" and must pay the tax. (An agricultural employer with ten or more workers in 20
weeks of a year, or payroll of $20,000 or more in a quarter, is also liable. A domestic employer
with payroll of $1,000 or more in a quarter is liable.)
Tax base. Like any tax, the UI payroll tax has two parts: a base and a rate. In Michigan,
the tax base, known as "taxable payroll," was the first $9,500 of a worker's earnings in a calendar
year from 1986 through 2002. The April 2002 changes in Michigan's UI law reduced the taxable
payroll to $9,000 starting in calendar year 2003. As shown in Table 3, the tax base in three of the
6

Three states (Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) collect a nominal fraction of the payroll tax from workers
(along the lines of the Social Security payroll tax) on the assumption that workers will be more likely to claim UI
benefits if they perceive that they have played a role in financing them (Blaustein 1993, p. 139). There appears to be
no evidence on this latter point.
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states neighboring Michigan is also slightly above the federally mandated minimum of $7,000.
Sixteen states have a taxable wage base that changes annually in relation to the state's average
weekly wage. All of these states have taxable wage bases substantially higher than Michigan's,
most in excess of $20,000.
Michigan's taxable payroll is well below the average annual earnings of full-time workers
in the state, which are on the order of $37,000. Hence, the taxable wage base is quite narrow and
necessitates higher tax rates than a broader base would, for a given level of benefits. The taxable
wage base has not always been so narrow. At the outset of the program in 1936, the wage base
was the same as Social Security's and covered about 93 percent of earnings (Hamermesh 1977, p.
72). Only in the 1960s did the UI wage base start to erode significantly relative to payrolls. In
the first quarter of 2002, the taxable wage base covered only 13 percent of total wages paid by
taxable employers in Michigan (see Table 3), and this will clearly drop further with the reduction
in the taxable wage base to $9,000 in 2003. Similarly, states neighboring Michigan have taxable
wages that are a small percentage of total wages (see Table 3).
The low taxable wage base tends to work against the employment prospects of low-wage,
high-turnover workers. Over 85 percent of the earnings of a full-time minimum-wage worker were
taxable in Michigan in 2002 (that is, $9,000 out of roughly $10,500 earned). In contrast, less than
25 percent of the earnings of a full-time worker at the average weekly wage were taxable ($9,000
out of roughly $37,000). It follows that the low taxable wage base creates an incentive for
employers to prefer high-wage to low-wage workers and shifts the distribution of employment
away from low-wage and toward high-wage workers (Hamermesh 1977, pp. 72–75). Similarly, an
employer who employs a succession of, for example, four workers to fill a given job in a calendar
year will pay more in UI payroll taxes for that job than will an employer who fills a similar job
with just one worker during the year. The incentive to prefer low-turnover workers is clear.
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Tax rates. In Michigan and every other state, UI payroll tax rates are "experience rated"
at the level of the employer, meaning that each employer's tax rate depends on the extent to
which that employer has laid off workers who have claimed and received UI benefits in the past.
In order to implement a system of experience rating, it is necessary to trace UI benefits received
by a worker to the employer who is in some sense responsible for that worker's unemployment.
This "charging" of benefits to employers is done in various ways. In 38 states, base period
employers are charged in proportion to the base period wages they paid the claimant. Michigan is
one of eight states that charges base period employers in reverse chronological order, with the
most recent base period employer charged up to 75 percent of the claimant's maximum benefit
amount, followed by the next most recent base period employer.
Not all benefits are charged to employers, however. First, some benefits, such as those
paid to workers who have quit voluntarily with good cause, dependents allowances, the federal
share (50 percent) of standby Extended Benefits, and emergency extended benefits are not
charged to any employer (these are known collectively as "noncharged" benefits). Second, some
benefits are "inactively charged"—that is, charged to firms that have gone out of business, which
obviously makes it impossible to collect UI payroll taxes. Third, some benefits are "ineffectively
charged"—that is, charged to a firm but uncollectable because the firm is at the maximum UI
payroll tax rate (see below). In such cases, further layoffs may be charged to the firm, but they
cannot result in higher tax rates or larger payments into the UI trust fund.
In practice, experience rating applies only to employers who have been liable (that is,
paying UI payroll taxes) for more than two years. In Michigan, new employers all pay a
"standard rate" of 2.7 percent for their first two years, except for new construction employers,
who pay the average construction industry rate (between 6.8 and 8.1 percent in recent years). In
their third and fourth years, employers pay a rate that combines a standard rate (which is specific
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to the year in business) with a rate calculated from their layoff experience during the first two or
three years of business (specifically, the Chargeable Benefits Component, as described below). In
their fifth and subsequent years, the payroll tax is the sum of three components, all of which are
specific to the employer and depend on past layoff experience.
The first component of Michigan's UI payroll tax is the "Chargeable Benefits
Component" (CBC), which is calculated by summing all UI benefits paid to workers laid off by
the employer during the past five years and dividing this by the UI taxable payroll of the
employer during the same five years:

CBC = UI benefits paid / UI taxable payroll

The CBC is rounded up to the next 0.1 percent and cannot exceed 6.0 percent in 2002 (this
maximum increases to 6.3 percent in 2003). For example, an employer whose workers received
$100,400 in UI benefits during the past five years and had a five-year taxable payroll of
$10,000,000 would have a CBC of 1.1 percent. Formulas similar to the above "benefit-ratio"
formula are used by 17 states (including Michigan and Illinois) to experience rate the UI taxes of
employers.
The second component of the payroll tax rate is the "Account Building Component"
(ABC), which is calculated in three steps. First, the employer's required reserves are calculated
by taking a fraction (3.75 percent in 2002) of the employer's total payroll (not taxable payroll)
during the past 12 months. Second, the employer's actual reserves are calculated by taking the
difference between all UI payroll tax payments ever made by the employer and all UI benefits
ever paid to workers laid off by the employer. (In effect, each employer has an account into
which all its UI payroll taxes flow and from which UI benefits are paid to its laid-off workers.
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The balance in this account is the employer's actual reserves.) Third, the required reserves and
actual reserves are used to calculate the ABC by the following formula:

ABC = [0.25 × (required reserves – actual reserves)] / total payroll

where total payroll is the employer's payroll during the past 12 months. The ABC is rounded up
to the next 0.1 percent and cannot be greater than 2 percent (or less than 0). For example, if the
above employer had annual total payroll of $6,000,000, its required reserves would be $225,000
(0.0375 × $6,000,000). If its actual reserves were $0 (payroll tax contributions equaled UI
benefits paid over the life of the employer), then the ABC would be 1 percent [0.2 × ($225,000
– $0)/$6,000,000]. Formulas like this are generally called "reserve-ratio" formulas and are used by
35 states (including Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin) to experience rate the UI taxes of
employers. Only Michigan and Pennsylvania use both a reserve-ratio formula and a benefit-ratio
formula to experience rate UI payroll taxes. Figures 1 and 2 show Michigan's CBC and ABC tax
schedules. The figures have the same scaling to emphasize that the variation in the CBC (and
therefore, the degree of experience rating that it produces) is greater than for the ABC.
The third component of the UI payroll tax rate is the nonchargeable benefits component
(NBC), which is a flat rate charged to all employers who have been in business for more than four
years. The NBC is either (1) 1 percent for employers who have incurred any benefit charges in
the last five years; or (2) a lower rate for employers who have incurred no benefit charges in the
last five years. The 1 percent rate for employers who have incurred a charge in the last five years
has existed for many years and is scheduled to continue into the future. The lower rate for
employers who have incurred no charge in the last five years fell by statute from 0.5 percent in
1993–1995, to 0.1 percent in 1999–2002. It is scheduled to fall to 0.06 percent in 2003. (Note
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that the NBC does not apply to employers who have been in business less than five years
because these employers already pay either a flat rate or a rate that combines an experience-rated
component with a flat rate.)
The resulting range of tax rates in Michigan and the ranges that are currently in effect in
neighboring states are shown in Table 3. Michigan's range of 0.06 to 6.3 percent is similar to the
ranges in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Wisconsin has a substantially greater range of tax rates—0 to
9.75 percent. Recall that Wisconsin also has a larger taxable wage base, which gives it greater
leverage to collect taxes from employers who frequently lay off workers. From the mid-1980s
well into the 1990s, Michigan had a maximum payroll tax rate of 10 percent, but its taxable wage
base has never exceeded $9,500.
Table 3 also shows that Michigan's average UI payroll tax—0.6 percent of total
wages—is slightly higher than that of other states in the region. This is partly because Michigan's
taxable wage base has been slightly higher than that of its neighboring states (except Wisconsin),
and partly because Michigan's dual experience rating system (which uses both a benefit-ratio
formula and a reserve-ratio formula) assigns most employers a higher tax rate than would a
system that uses a single formula.
Policy issues in UI financing. It should be clear from the above discussion that
Michigan's method of setting UI payroll taxes results in experience rating that is incomplete. This
is because the payroll tax is capped at 6.00 percent as of 2002. If the payroll tax were not
capped, many employers would face higher tax rates as a result of their layoff experience.
Because it is capped, these employers pay less into the UI system than is drawn by the workers
they lay off.
This leads to the first of two issues concerning the UI payroll tax that are of longstanding
concern to policymakers, employers, and UI advocacy groups—effective subsidization of high20

layoff employers by low-layoff employers through the UI system. The most recent study of
cross-subsidies in Michigan, by Munts and Asher (1980), used data for 1969–1976 and found
that Michigan's cross-subsidies were the highest of the 21 states studied. However, this study is
rather out-of-date. The most recent evidence on cross-subsidies (Woodbury 2002a) examined
firm-level data from Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Washington State during 1985–1995. In
Pennsylvania, which has a UI payroll tax structure similar to Michigan's, benefit payments to
laid-off construction workers were twice the payroll taxes paid by the construction industry.
Moreover, a firm that was subsidized in one year (that is, had benefit charges exceeding UI
payroll taxes) had a probability in excess of 50 percent of still being subsidized five years later.
The original rationale for experience rating the UI payroll tax was to create a financial
incentive for employers to avoid layoffs and hence stabilize employment (Witte 1962). The
second main concern generated by the cap on the payroll tax is that, for high-layoff employers
who reach the maximum tax rate, the incentive to avoid layoffs is removed. Several studies have
estimated large impacts of experience rating on temporary layoffs. For example, Card and Levine
(1994) found that complete experience rating would reduce temporary layoffs by 50 percent in a
recession.
As mentioned above, in April 2002, the Michigan legislature lowered the taxable wage
base and widened the spread between the minimum and maximum UI payroll tax rates. The
impact of these changes on cross-subsidization and employer layoff behavior is difficult to
predict: The reduced taxable wage base will exacerbate the cross-subsidies and increase the
incentive for employers at the maximum tax rate to lay off workers, but the reduced minimum
and increased maximum tax rates will have the opposite effects. Firm-level data and a simulation
model would be needed to estimate the impacts of the tax changes with any confidence. However,
the legislated changes are probably too small to have significant impacts.
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Trust fund adequacy. Unlike Social Security, UI is not a pay-as-you-go system. Rather,
each state places UI payroll taxes that it collects in a trust fund from which benefits are paid. The
intent is to "forward-fund" UI so that, in a recession, funds required to pay benefits will be
available and UI will serve as an automatic stabilizer. The bottom four rows of Table 3 display
figures on the UI revenues and trust fund balances of Michigan and its neighboring states. During
2001, Michigan collected nearly $1 billion in UI payroll taxes, and in early 2002, it had a trust
fund balance of about $2.4 billion, the largest in the region.
The trust fund must be viewed in relation to the demands that may be placed on it. Two
widely used measures of UI trust fund adequacy are shown at the bottom of Table 3. The
first—the high-cost multiple—is the trust fund as a percentage of state taxable wages divided by
the highest ratio of benefits to taxable wages ever paid in the state's history. The high-cost
multiple, then, suggests the fraction of a year for which a state's existing trust fund would be
adequate if benefits were paid at the highest rate ever observed in the past. The second
measure—the average high-cost multiple—is (again) the trust fund as a percentage of state taxable
wages, but this time divided by the average ratio of benefits to taxable wages paid over the
program's history. This is a less stringent measure of trust fund adequacy because it suggests the
fraction of a year for which a state's existing trust fund would be adequate if benefits were paid at
their average historical rate.
Standards for trust fund adequacy have been somewhat elusive. The Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation (1995) recommended that states maintain an average high-cost
multiple of 1. But Emsellem et al. (2002) consider states with a high-cost multiple of 0.75 to be
adequately funded. For the United States as a whole in early 2002, the high-cost multiple was
0.54, and the average high-cost multiple was 0.75.
Table 3 shows that Michigan's average high-cost multiple was 0.65 in early 2002—below
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both the national average and the levels that have been considered "adequate." Illinois and Ohio
are also below the national average; Indiana and Wisconsin substantially exceed the average.
The April 2002 amendments to Michigan's UI law reduced the taxable wage base and the
minimum payroll tax rate but increased the maximum tax rate. The Bureau of Unemployment &
Workers' Compensation has referred to these changes overall as a tax cut. But the April 2002
amendments also increased the maximum benefit amount, which will increase benefit payments.
It seems clear that the adequacy of Michigan's UI trust fund, as measured by the high-cost
multiple, will fall as a result of the amendments.
Competing Goals of the UI System
The origins of the UI program are rooted in the idea of social insurance—that it is
desirable (and efficient) to partially replace the lost earnings of workers who lose their jobs
through no fault of their own, and that the extent of wage replacement should be tied to the
regular earnings of the job loser (see, for example, the legislative history of UI by Witte 1962).
This goal was reiterated by the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995, p. 8):
The most important objective of the U.S. system of Unemployment Insurance is the
provision of temporary, partial wage replacement as a matter of right to involuntarily
unemployed individuals who have demonstrated a prior attachment to the labor force.
This support should help to meet the necessary expenses of these workers as they search
for employment that takes advantage of their skills and experience.
The goal, then, is to increase the stability of income and consumption of workers who have a
history of labor force attachment.
A potentially conflicting view is that UI can and should serve as an essential component
of an income transfer system that redistributes income to the working poor. This view is rarely
stated explicitly, but it has been implicit in various policy discussions of UI following the growth
of anti-poverty programs in the 1960s. For example, 20 years ago, Corson and Nicholson (1982)
criticized one of the extended UI benefit programs as "target inefficient" because it paid
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"substantial" benefits to the nonpoor. In reviewing the book, Hamermesh (1982) remarked that
"this poverty-fighter's view of UI . . . is quite inconsistent with the origins and goals of the UI
program . . . ."
Interest in the potential for UI to serve as an anti-poverty program (or as an important
part of a larger anti-poverty strategy) has been heightened by the welfare reforms of 1996. As
former welfare recipients have flowed into the labor market following those reforms, the
effectiveness of UI has been measured increasingly by its ability to provide income support for a
growing number of unemployed former welfare recipients, who generally have earnings that are
quite low. For example, the U.S. General Accounting Office (2000, p. 7) noted that "few states
have adjusted their UI programs to eliminate practices that may present difficulties to low-wage
workers, particularly these new workers [former welfare recipients]." Other research—for
example, Gustafson and Levine (1998) and Kaye (2001)—has raised specific concerns about the
extent to which nonmonetary eligibility criteria prevent former welfare recipients from obtaining
UI. Clearly, the effectiveness of UI is being judged by its ability to provide income support to
workers who have not traditionally been within its ambit.
To argue that UI should not be reformed with an eye to assisting former welfare
recipients because it is not intended as income support for former welfare recipients is circular
reasoning. However, relaxing eligibility requirements inevitably brings workers into the system
who are at higher risk of unemployment, more likely to draw benefits, and more likely to abuse
the system. The result is a higher-cost system that tends to redistribute income from higherwage, low-unemployment workers to lower-wage, high unemployment workers, rather than
insuring unemployment risks. In the 1970s, when the UI system came to be perceived as "too
generous," reductions in benefits and potential durations followed, ultimately undermining the
adequacy of benefits for the traditional beneficiaries of UI (Blaustein 1993).
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The goal should be to make changes in the system that are likely to benefit former welfare
recipients and are also consistent with the original insurance purposes of UI. Two changes that
probably meet these criteria would be relaxing the requirement that UI recipients must seek fulltime work and making UI available to workers who have quit a job in order to care for a
dependent. The case for these changes is that other eligibility provisions are sufficient to ensure
that such workers have a reasonable attachment to the labor force. However, two changes that
probably do not meet the above criteria would be reducing monetary eligibility requirements
generally and making UI available to workers who have quit a job in order to attend school. The
first weakens the test by which workers are judged to be attached to the labor force, and the
second is a matter of choice and hence is not an insurable risk.

Reemployment Programs
Reemployment policy in Michigan and other states has been significantly shaped by
federal policy, which has funded and directed most state employment and training programs.
Federal reemployment policy can be dated to the passage in 1933 of the Wagner-Peyser Act,
which established the U.S. Employment Service (ES). Throughout its history, the ES has served
as a free public labor exchange, registering job seekers, taking job orders from employers, and
matching workers with job vacancies. Since the establishment of UI in 1935, the ES has also
administered the nonseparation criteria for UI (discussed above), which attempt to ensure that UI
recipients are able to work, available for work, and seeking work. Although the ES has had other
goals and functions over the years, these two—matching workers to jobs through placement and
other reemployment services, and administering the UI work test—have been consistent.
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) has pointed federal and state policy to
assist unemployed workers in a new direction. This section reviews the evolution of
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reemployment policy through WIA and describes how reemployment services are changing under
WIA. It also discusses the activities of the Michigan Department of Career Development and its
role under WIA, and poses research questions that will need to be addressed in evaluating WIA's
effectiveness.
The Employment Service
Like UI, the ES is a federal-state system; that is, each state administers its own ES
program, but the U.S. Department of Labor funds and oversees the state programs. Accordingly,
the role of the ES has changed as the emphasis of federal reemployment policy has changed. This
evolution of the ES's role is summarized in Table 4, which lists major federal legislation on
employment and training, noting the implications of each piece of legislation for the ES and
reemployment policy.
Until the 1960s, reemployment policy in the United States emphasized job placement
and assumed that unemployed workers were job-ready and merely needed to be matched to an
employer. During the 1960s, however, the Manpower Development and Training Act and the
Economic Opportunity Act shifted emphasis away from job placement and toward "secondchance" training of workers who were either poorly served by the conventional system of public
education or dislocated as a result of structural economic change. The role of the ES in this shift
was at first substantial, but that role dwindled with the adoption of the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) in 1973. Under CETA, training services were
administered locally with the result, in the view of many, that reemployment services became
fragmented. The diminished role of the ES continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s
following adoption of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in 1982.
During the 1980s, there was much dissatisfaction with the ES, and questions were raised
about its role and importance. Also during the 1980s, however, convincing research (reviewed by
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LaLonde 1995) became available showing that existing government training programs fell short of
their hoped-for results. Moreover, a series of demonstrations using randomized trials suggested
the effectiveness of relatively inexpensive reemployment services—job search workshops,
interview and resume preparation classes, and other assistance—in helping unemployed workers
(see the review by Meyer 1995). As a result, the former optimism about second-chance training
was replaced by an emphasis on placing workers in jobs. In short, the sentiment in favor of
"training first" was replaced by a growing belief in "work first."
The reemphasis on "work first" that took hold during the late 1990s is reflected in the
federal funding of training programs in Michigan for disadvantaged adults, youth, and dislocated
workers. As can be seen in Table 5, overall funding for these programs fell by over 40 percent
between 1994 and 2000, although it has risen slightly since. Funding for the youth program was
cut more severely than was funding for the adult or dislocated worker programs. This was a
response to evidence from the National JTPA Demonstration that training programs for out-ofschool youths had no positive impact on earnings. [See U.S. General Accounting Office (1996)
and Bloom et al. (1997) for summaries of the evidence, much of which was available as early as
1993.]
The new emphasis on "work first" is also reflected in amendments to the Social Security
Act that established the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services initiative in 1993. Under
profiling, UI claimants who are likely to exhaust their UI benefits are required to attend job
search assistance workshops conducted by the ES or risk losing their UI benefits. [Eberts and
O'Leary (1996) discuss Michigan's profiling system; Corson and Decker (2000) offer evidence on
the effectiveness of profiling.]
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA)
The emphasis on "work first" is again clear in the Workforce Investment Act of 1998,
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which embodies two main changes in reemployment policy. First, it requires that states provide
most federally funded employment and training services through a system of One-Stop Centers,
which provide all reemployment services (or information about and referral to such services) at a
single location. The intent of One-Stop Centers is to offer an attractive, logically organized office
that directs any job seeker to information, assistance, or programs needed to gain employment.
Moreover, One-Stop Centers encourage coordination of services by collecting the day-to-day
operations of various reemployment programs under a single manager.
Second, WIA has replaced the JTPA programs for economically disadvantaged and
dislocated workers with programs for adults, dislocated workers, and youth that deemphasize the
differences among groups needing assistance. Specifically, WIA provides three levels of
services—core (including basic services such as job search assistance), intensive (including
services such as assessment that require staff assistance), and training (for eligible workers). As
part of this overhaul, the Private Industry Councils that existed under JTPA are replaced with
Workforce Development Boards. This latter change is significant because, whereas Private
Industry Councils were concerned mainly with the provision of training under JTPA, Workforce
Development Boards have responsibility in principle for overseeing all reemployment services
and government-funded training in their region. (In practice, further legislation will be required
before Workforce Development Boards are able to influence programs like Vocational
Rehabilitation and Vocational-Technical Education.)
The idea of "one-stop" reemployment services is hardly new: Haber and Murray (1966)
referred to it as early as 1966, and a year later, the Manpower Administration issued a
memorandum on "Improving Communication and Service to the Public," which discussed
integrated delivery of human services at central locations. Accordingly, WIA must be viewed as
an attempt to bring about what has long been viewed as desirable—the centralization of
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information and other reemployment services, including referral to training, to promote
employment.
Reemployment Services in Michigan
The traditional role of the ES—that of a free public employment agency—has involved
provision of five main services: assessment (which may include counseling and aptitude and
interest testing), job referral, job development (which is similar to job referral except that an ES
interviewer contacts one or more employers known to hire workers with the applicant's skills),
referral to training, and other job search assistance services. As a result, it has been natural to
make state ES agencies responsible for One-Stop Centers. Michigan's One-Stop Centers are
known as Michigan Works! and are administered by the Michigan Department of Career
Development.
Michigan Works! differs from One-Stops in other states in two ways. First, in 1997,
Michigan dissolved the Michigan Employment Security Commission, which used to house
Michigan's ES agency, and contracted out ES services rather than having those services provided
by state workers. Second, at the same time, Michigan was one of a handful of states that was
granted permission by the Department of Labor to allow ES applicants to serve themselves and
refer themselves to jobs, rather than rely on ES staff for job referrals. In Michigan, then, workers
register with Michigan Works! by entering information on themselves into a computerized "talent
bank." They are then able to access job listings and can contact employers without the assistance
of Michigan Works! staff. Research does not exist on whether this approach benefits workers
more than the traditional approach, which requires staff assistance. It is clear, however, that the
self-service approach has made it difficult to monitor the extent to which use of the ES results in
job referrals and placements.
Table 6 compares the 1999 activities of Michigan Works! with the those of ES agencies in
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neighboring states (Program Year 1999—July 1999 to June 2000—is the most recent year for
which data are available). The overall level of activity of these agencies can be measured by ES
applicants as a percentage of the labor force. The ES agencies of Michigan, Indiana, and
Wisconsin all appear to have activity levels that are fairly close to the national average. Ohio has
an unusually active ES, and Illinois has the least active ES of the states shown.
The mix of clients served by Michigan's ES differs from that in neighboring states in
several respects. Mainly, a far higher percentage of Michigan Works! clients are UI claimants
(who in principle need to register with the ES in order to remain eligible for benefits) than is the
case elsewhere. The finding suggests that Michigan makes more effort than other states to ensure
that UI claimants are seeking work. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that, when the
Michigan Employment Security Commission was dissolved, efforts were made to ensure that UI
claimants would register with Michigan Works!
Table 6 also suggests that Michigan Works! is serving fewer economically disadvantaged
and disabled workers than are ES agencies in neighboring states. Whether this is actually the case
is debatable. It seems likely that the conversion of One-Stop Centers to self-service in Michigan
lowered the reported number of disadvantaged and disabled workers who are served by Michigan
Works! Disadvantaged and disabled workers who register with Michigan Works! are not required
to classify themselves as such—in fact, Michigan Works! staff may urge them not to report that
they are disadvantaged or disabled in the belief that doing so would lower their chances of getting
a job. If this is the case, then these figures represent a failure to report services provided to
disadvantaged and disabled workers. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the extent to which
Michigan Works! potentially serves the needs of disadvantaged and disabled workers is difficult
to track. The underlying problem is that the U.S. Department of Labor has not imposed uniform
reporting requirements on the ES agencies of the states.
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The middle panel of Table 6 shows the percentage of ES applicants receiving various
services in each state and nationally, and the bottom panel shows the percentage of UI claimants
who receive various services. Michigan's rates of training referral, job referral, and job placement
are far below the national average and the rates in neighboring states. This could reflect
Michigan's self-service approach, discussed above, although other states that have moved to self
service report much higher rates of service delivery. These states have devised ways of tracking
the extent to which workers who serve themselves contact employers (that is, "self-refer") and
obtain jobs. No research has examined the relative effectiveness of self-referrals and referrals
made with ES staff assistance; this is an important question that is ripe for research.
The middle panel of Table 6 suggests that Michigan provides less job search assistance to
workers than do other states (except Wisconsin). Job search assistance includes job search
workshops, job-finding clubs, and classes in job-finding skills, all of which are important parts of
UI profiling. The bottom panel shows that Michigan provides job search assistance to only 2
percent of UI claimants, compared with nearly 40 percent nationally, suggesting that Michigan is
profiling very few UI claimants. So although Michigan is registering a higher percentage of its UI
claimants than most states are (top panel of Table 6), it is providing them with relatively few
reportable services.
Unfortunately, the data gathered by the states and the U.S. Department of Labor on ES
activities have been rather uneven over the years. However, to the extent possible, Table 7
compares the clientele and reemployment services provided in the United States generally with
those in Michigan in 1995 (that is, before WIA) and 1999 (the most recent program year for
which data are available).
The upper panel of Table 7 shows that the number of ES and Michigan Works!
applicants fell during the late 1990s, which were years of falling unemployment. Nationally,
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nearly 40 percent of ES applicants were UI claimants; however, the percentage of Michigan
Works! applicants who were UI claimants was rather volatile. The ES administers special
programs for veterans, and this is reflected in the percentage of ES applicants—10 to 12 percent
nationally—who are veterans. In 1999, a higher percentage of Michigan Works! clients were
veterans, and a lower percentage were economically disadvantaged than was the case nationally.
Also, in both 1994 and 1999, a higher percentage of Michigan Works! clients were farm workers
than was the case nationally.
The bottom panel of Table 7 shows that, nationally, the percentage of ES applicants who
received job search assistance rose from 27 percent to 40 percent between 1995 and 1999,
reflecting the adoption of UI profiling in 1994. (Unfortunately, state-by-state breakdowns of job
search assistance are not available.) Training referrals were rare in both 1994 and 1999.
Nationally, over 40 percent of ES applicants received job referrals in 1995 and 1999, and over 10
percent were placed in a job. In Michigan, however, job referrals fell between 1995 and 1999 due
to the adoption of self-service by Michigan Works! in 1997 (see above). No research has
examined whether self-referral is more or less effective than the traditional approach—that is,
referrals made with ES staff assistance—and this is clearly a field that is ripe for research.
Michigan's Response to Changing Federal Policy and Policy Issues
Although reemployment programs are largely federally funded, much variation exists
among states in the organization and administration of reemployment services, and under WIA,
these interstate differences are likely to increase. Such differences represent both politics and
efforts to deliver reemployment services effectively.
Since 1999, the Michigan Department of Career Development (MDCD) has been
responsible for the state's reemployment and training programs. Originally, the MDCD consisted
of three agencies—the Employment Service Agency, which has already been discussed; the
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Office of Workforce Development, whose main responsibility is to administer Work First, the
state's welfare-to-work program, but which also administers other training programs; and
Michigan Rehabilitation Services, whose main responsibility is to administer the Vocational
Rehabilitation component of Workers' Compensation (see below). A later executive order moved
three additional agencies into MDCD—the offices of Career and Technical Education Services,
Postsecondary Service, and Adult Education. These latter are essentially educational programs
that are outside the scope of this chapter. MDCD currently employs about 1,100 personnel and
in 1999–2000 directed the distribution of nearly $550 million, over 95 percent of which were
federal funds (Michigan Department of Career Development 2000). Many observers expect the
organization of these agencies to change after the Engler Administration ends.
WIA represents a significant change in the reemployment system, and its success will
turn on whether the assumptions underlying its adoption are correct. The above discussion
suggests the importance of the following research questions:
1. Is WIA's "work first" approach effective? WIA has been criticized because it
emphasizes job placement over training and reduces funding for training (Bartik and Hollenbeck
2000). An essential question for reemployment policy remains whether programs that encourage
employment (or rapid reemployment, even in a low-wage job) are better for workers and society
in the long run than are government training programs.
2. What is the value of various reemployment services? Of the reemployment services
traditionally provided by the ES—job referral, counseling and assessment, job development, and
other (intensive) services—only job referral and intensive services have been evaluated
comprehensively. However, existing evidence on the effectiveness of referrals has been criticized
because, unlike the most convincing evidence on employment and training policies, it has not
been based on randomized trials. Also, the intrinsic value of intensive job search assistance
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remains unclear. Existing experimental research suggests that job search workshops reduce
unemployment duration by imposing an additional requirement on UI recipients (that is, the
requirement to report for services) rather than by enhancing workers' job search abilities per se
(Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997). In order for One-Stop Centers to function effectively,
knowledge of what services work best for various groups of workers is essential.
3. Do the arguments in favor of a public labor exchange—such as those made by Bendick
(1989) more than a decade ago—continue to hold in a day of relatively easy internet access?
Little is known about the value of universal access to information of the kind available through
America's Job Bank, the computerized national labor exchange. Arguments for the public subsidy
and provision of information on jobs turn on the value of such information and the failure of
private markets to generate enough information.
4. How is the performance of reemployment services best gauged? The performance
indicators set out in WIA have been criticized by researchers for their focus on easily measurable
outcomes that are weakly related to the value of reemployment services and that may create
incentives for One-Stop Centers to assist those applicants who are least in need of services (that
is, to "cream"). For example, emphasis on the "entered-employment rate"—the proportion of
applicants who enter employment within 90 days—can be expected to induce One-Stop Centers
to focus on workers who might easily find jobs on their own rather than on workers requiring
greater effort to place (U. S. General Accounting Office 2002). There is much need for research
into performance measures that are easily obtained and that also gauge the benefits and costs of
services provided.
WIA brings reemployment policy closer to the focus on job placement and "work first"
that existed before the emergence of federally funded training programs in the 1960s, but with a
twist. While attempting to retain what many view as the benefits of a reemployment system that
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receives substantial direction from local community interests, WIA promises to centralize the
locus of information, training, and other services that help unemployed workers in One-Stop
Centers. Evaluating whether WIA is effective and learning what can be done to improve the
reemployment system will require data and innovative research that will occupy policymakers
and researchers for years to come.

Workers' Compensation and Vocational Rehabilitation
Every state except Texas requires virtually every employer to carry insurance that covers
and compensates workers who are injured on the job or suffer work-related illness. This Workers'
Disability Compensation (WC) insurance covers medical care associated with the injury or
illness, occupational rehabilitation services necessary before the worker can return to work, and
cash benefits that partially replace the earnings lost by the worker as a result of the injury.
Unlike UI, WC has no federal component—each state has adopted a WC system without
federal incentives or mandates. All but four states adopted WC between 1911 and 1921
(Michigan's WC law dates to 1912). Before WC existed, liability for a workplace injury
essentially fell on the worker. In order to recover any damages resulting from a workplace injury,
a worker needed to sue the employer and show that the employer's negligence had caused the
injury. Employers, in turn, had three powerful common-law defenses against such suits, which
made it extremely difficult for workers to win damages, and even workers who prevailed received
a remedy only after great expense and long delay. Employer liability statutes, adopted in 35
states between 1885 and 1910, restricted employers' common-law defenses and improved the
likelihood that a worker would recover damages for a workplace injury. But even under employer
liability statutes, workers had to sue employers for damages, which was both costly and time-
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consuming.7
In contrast, WC shifts much of the liability for workplace injuries to the employer. Every
WC law has three essential features. First, WC is a no-fault insurance system—if a worker is
injured on the job, he or she receives benefits that are specified in the law regardless of who is at
fault. Second, WC is intended as the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries and hence limits the
employer's liability. That is, in exchange for buying WC insurance, the employer's liability is
limited to providing the benefits specified in the law, and workers give up their right to sue the
employer in exchange for the certainty of receiving those specified benefits in a timely fashion.
Third, employer participation in the system is mandatory—with few exceptions, employers are
required to buy WC insurance that provides benefits specified in the law. (In Michigan and six
other states, employers with fewer than three workers are exempt from coverage. Most states
have special provisions allowing exemption of some agricultural and domestic employers. Federal
workers, longshore, maritime, and railroad workers are covered by separate systems. In most
states, including Michigan, state and local government workers are covered by the state's WC
law.)
Although the principles of WC are clear, disputes arise routinely over whether an injury
or illness is compensable (for example, is the injury or illness in fact work-related?), as do
questions about the adequacy of medical treatment, rehabilitation services, and earnings
replacement benefits. Each state has procedures for handling such disputes, which arise in
roughly 20 percent of Michigan's WC claims. The state provides and administers these dispute
resolution procedures, which include mediation, a pretrial hearing, a trial conducted before a WC
magistrate who specializes in WC cases, and an appeals process that includes review by the
Workers' Compensation Appellate Commission. Claimants often employ attorneys to represent
7

Useful general references on Workers' Compensation include Butler (1999), Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton
(2001), and Williams, Turnbull, and Cheit (1982).

36

them in such procedures, and civil lawsuits remain a possibility in unusual cases (Falaris, Link,
and Staten 1995). Welch (2000) includes a useful guide to dispute resolution procedures in
Michigan.
Ideally, an efficient WC system would minimize the sum of all costs due to workplace
accidents and injuries—that is, the sum of (1) losses to victims of accidents, (2) losses due to
reduced output from accidents, (3) the costs of accident prevention, and (4) the costs of
administering the system (Butler 1999, chapter 7). Few studies view WC in such an economic
context, however. Rather, policy and legislative discussions of WC have been dominated by three
general topics which address the economic goals of the system only indirectly: benefit adequacy,
costs (including whether the existing delivery system is efficient), and whether the system
improves workplace safety. The following discussion follows the more policy-oriented
approach, focusing mainly on benefit adequacy and costs in Michigan and neighboring states.
Workers' Compensation Benefits in Michigan and Neighboring States
It is useful to begin by distinguishing between "medical only" claims and "lost-time"
claims. Most WC claims are for relatively minor injuries that involve medical treatment but no
wage replacement benefits. These "medical only" cases have been estimated to account for 76
percent of all WC claims nationally during 1996–1998, but for only 6.2 percent of all WC
benefits paid during that time (Mont et al. 2002). Lost-time claims involve payment of cash wage
replacement benefits. In Michigan, the number of medical-only claims is not tracked, but the
number of lost-time cases has fallen sharply from about 95,000 in 1988 to under 44,000 in 2001,
reflecting a general decline in workplace injury rates (Welch 2002).
Wage replacement benefits are of five types. "Temporary total" benefits are paid to
workers who are expected to recover but are unable to work at all for some time. Some workers
with a temporary disability return to work before they recover fully, taking on less work for a
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period of time during which they receive "temporary partial" benefits. Temporary benefits (total
and partial together) account for 71 percent of all WC cases involving wage replacement benefits
and for 26 percent of all WC benefits paid (medical, rehabilitation, and wage replacement) in
cases that involve wage replacement benefits (see Table 8, which is based on Mont et al. 2002).
Workers who are not expected to recover fully from an injury or illness receive
"permanent" disability benefits, which may be either "permanent partial" or "permanent total."
Permanent partial benefits account for 28 percent of all WC lost-time cases, but they account for
63 percent of all WC lost-time benefits. In contrast, permanent total benefits (along with death
benefits, which are the fifth type of benefit) account for just less than 1 percent of all WC losttime cases, but for 11 percent of all WC lost-time benefits (see Table 8).
How do the benefits provided by WC in Michigan compare with those in neighboring
states? Table 9 offers a summary. Michigan and three of its neighboring states provide "full"
medical benefits to WC recipients, meaning that all "reasonable and necessary" medical care
associated with the covered injury or illness is provided or reimbursed. In Ohio (the exception), a
worker must be examined by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation Medical Section after 90
days of temporary total compensation to determine eligibility for continued treatment and
compensation. Ohio is unusual in this limitation (only six other states limit medical benefits
under WC in some way). Nevertheless, to contain the costs of medical benefits under WC,
insurers in Michigan and elsewhere have resorted to a number of expedients, such as managed
care and fee schedules that specify the maximum that a health care provider can charge for a given
service (similar to the fee schedules that exist for Medicare and private health coverage). Also, in
Michigan and Indiana, the employer makes the initial selection of the health care provider.
In Michigan and its neighboring states, vocational rehabilitation benefits are provided by
law; hence, the employer is responsible for rehabilitation costs. In Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana,
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the worker is required to accept vocational rehabilitation or suffer reduced wage replacement
benefits. Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio have rehabilitation units that provide rehabilitation services
directly. Michigan Rehabilitation Services, in addition, provides referrals and monitors cases.
In most states, WC wage replacement benefits—temporary and permanent, partial and
total—are specified as two-thirds of a worker's pre-tax, pre-injury weekly wages up to a
maximum. The maximum is usually specified as a percentage of the state's average weekly wage
(SAWW in Table 9). This is the case in the states that neighbor Michigan, except for Ohio, where
temporary total benefits are 72 percent of pre-injury wages for the first 12 weeks of payment.
Wage replacement benefits are not subject to either federal or state income taxation, in contrast to
UI benefits. Also, in all states, wage replacement benefits start only after a waiting period of 3 to
7 days, although many states pay benefits for the waiting period retroactively if the disability
exceeds some specified period of time (see Table 9 for the waiting periods and retroactivity for
temporary total benefits).
Since 1982, Michigan has taken a different approach than most other states by specifying
wage replacement benefits as 80 percent of a worker's "spendable" (or after-tax) pre-injury
weekly wages, up to 90 percent of the SAWW. (Five other states also determine benefits as a
percentage of spendable or after-tax earnings.) To determine the worker's pre-injury wage,
Michigan averages wages in the highest 39 of the 52 weeks before the injury. Note that a worker
whose average tax rate exceeds 20 percent would receive higher wage replacement benefits under
the Michigan formula than under the standard formula.
Permanent partial benefits, summarized at the bottom of Table 9, are the most
contentious category of benefits because disputes arise over both the degree of disability (since
the disability is "partial") and whether the disability is truly permanent. Permanent partial
benefits may be paid in either of two ways. First, "scheduled" benefits (called "specific loss"
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benefits in Michigan) are paid for specific injuries that are listed in the law, such as loss of a
hand. Michigan and most states pay scheduled loss benefits as a number of weeks of benefits up
to a dollar maximum. Table 9 shows the scheduled loss benefits paid for loss of a hand and loss
of an eye in Michigan and its neighboring states. For example, a worker who loses a hand in
Michigan receives 215 weeks of benefits (up to $138,460) regardless of the amount of work time
lost.
Second, nonscheduled benefits are paid for injuries that are not listed in the law, such as a
back injury. Determination of nonscheduled benefits can be quite complicated (Berkowitz and
Burton 1987). In Michigan, an attempt is made to estimate the wage loss resulting from the
disability (in many cases the wage loss is negotiated). Many other states use a level of disability
expressed as a percentage to determine nonscheduled permanent partial benefits. The bottom
panel of Table 9 shows how nonscheduled permanent partial benefits compare in Michigan and
neighboring states.
In 1972, the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation published
recommended standards for state WC laws (National Commission 1972). Michigan's law
currently meets many of the Commission's recommendations, but in two areas Michigan's law
falls short of both the Commission's recommendations and neighboring states. First, the
Commission's recommendations call for maximum wage replacement benefits equal to 100
percent of the SAWW. Illinois, Ohio, and Wisconsin do so, but Michigan sets its maximum at 90
percent of the SAWW. (Indiana sets its maximum by statute, rather than in relation to SAWW,
which

also

fails

the

Commission's

recommendations.)

Second,

the

Commission's

recommendations call for broader coverage provisions than does Michigan's law. In particular,
Michigan does not require employers of fewer than three workers to carry WC, whereas
neighboring states make coverage compulsory even for very small employers.
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Workers' Compensation Costs in Michigan and Neighboring States
During 2000, private insurance companies provided roughly 58 percent of the WC
insurance in Michigan (Mont et al. 2002). The remaining 42 percent was provided by employers
who self-insured—Michigan, like most states, allows companies that are large and financially
sound to administer their own WC programs and provide the benefits that are specified in the
law. (Michigan also allows smaller employers belonging to a trade organization to "group selfinsure.")
A third option for providing WC insurance currently exists in half the states—a stateoperated insurance fund. In 20 states, these funds are "competitive," meaning that they exist
along with (or in competition with) private insurers in the state. In five states, the largest of
which is Ohio, the state fund is "exclusive," meaning that private insurers are not permitted to
offer WC insurance in the state. Michigan had a competitive state fund until the end of 1994,
when that fund was privatized (it was bought by Blue Cross Blue Shield and is now known as
the Accident Fund). Michigan is the only state that has privatized a state fund. In fact, the trend
nationally has been toward creating competitive state funds—Minnesota did so in 1984, and
eight other states followed during the 1990s. These state funds were created mainly because
regulation of WC premium rates at low levels resulted in losses for many private insurers, which
caused them to pull out of those states (see below). The relative merits of state funds and the
implications of the various arrangements for providing WC have been treated at length by
Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001). Apart from Ohio, which has an exclusive state fund,
neither Michigan nor its neighboring states has a state WC fund.
Until the early 1980s, rates for WC premia were set in every state by a regulatory
process that involved several steps. First, the state would select a rating organization, which in
many states was the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI). (Michigan had, and
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still has, an independent rating bureau.) NCCI would prescribe both a standard reporting
procedure for all employers and a system of industry and occupational classification that is
unique to WC. [The NCCI classification system divides all employers into five broad industry
groups, then specifies occupational classifications within those industry groups. Over 500
classifications are currently used, although 71 classifications account for over 73 percent of
covered payroll (Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton 2000, Appendix C). Alternative systems are
similar.] Next, NCCI collected data on the benefits (or losses) paid and the premiums collected
by the WC insurance carriers in the state. These data generated expected losses (or "pure
premia") for each classification. A loading factor was then added to the expected losses to cover
administrative expenses and profits. The result was a "manual rate" for each classification, stated
in dollars per $100 of payroll. These manual rates were filed with the state WC bureau, which
would approve or modify the rates. The result was a set of administered prices that all insurers
had to charge. Exceptions occurred, particularly with medium and large employers that might be
experience rated, but the exceptions were also regulated by the state WC bureau.
Since 1981, most states have moved to "open competition" in setting WC premia.
Michigan and Illinois were early to do so (in 1983 and 1982, respectively), and Indiana did so in
1989. (Ohio has an exclusive state fund, and Wisconsin has maintained a system of administered
pricing.) Open competition can take various forms, but in general it means that insurers can
compete for business by offering employers different premium rates at the start of the policy
period. Rates are still based on the employer's industry and the occupational classification of
workers, but each insurer can now set his or her own rate. Most large employers are experience
rated, and insurers frequently adjust their basic rates for different employers. Not surprisingly,
insurers resisted the move to competition, but it is now well established in most states.
Interstate comparisons of WC costs are not straightforward. The main difficulty is the
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need to adjust for interstate differences in industry composition, which clearly influence
statewide averages of WC premia paid by employers. In addition, difficulties arise in obtaining
comparable data across states, in estimating insurers' loadings for administrative expenses and
profits, and in estimating the effects of experience rating and other discounts on premia
ultimately paid. Nevertheless, careful interstate comparisons of WC costs do exist, and two are
summarized in Table 10.
The first row of Table 10 reports adjusted manual rates that have been constructed in
recent years by the Oregon Department of Consumer and Business (2002). These are weighted
averages of manual rates in 50 NCCI industry-occupation categories that account for 68 percent
of covered payroll in Oregon. The weights applied are derived from Oregon's industryoccupational mix, rather than the industry-occupational mix of the United States, and this is their
main drawback. Essentially, they suggest the premium rate that the average Oregon employer
would face if he or she moved to another state. Nevertheless, Oregon's industry-occupational mix
is not so unlike that of the country generally that these rates cannot be used to give some notion
of relative interstate WC rates.
The Oregon adjusted rates suggest that WC costs in Michigan are below those in Ohio
and Illinois, and above those in Wisconsin and Indiana. (Indiana's WC costs routinely come in last
or close to last in such interstate comparisons, reflecting what many WC researchers believe to be
an inadequate benefit structure.) Nationally, Michigan is slightly above the median state. This is
in sharp contrast to Michigan's position 20 years ago, when it was one of the highest WC cost
states in the nation despite having statutory benefits that (as now) are no more generous than the
median state's (Burton, Hunt, and Krueger 1985; Rence 1982).
The second row of Table 10 reports the 1995 adjusted manual rates that were constructed
through a laborious process by Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001, pp. 317–392). These
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adjusted rates represent the premia that the average U.S. employer would face if he or she moved
to a given state. Unfortunately, 1995 is the last year for which these adjusted manual rates have
been constructed, but they tell a story similar to that told by the Oregon index with respect to
Michigan's position compared with its neighboring states. In addition, Thomason, Schmidle, and
Burton constructed a national adjusted manual rate, which suggests that Michigan's WC costs
were slightly below the national average in the early and middle 1990s.
What accounts for the relative decline in WC costs in Michigan during the last 20 years?
In the late 1970s, Michigan's business community complained that Michigan's WC costs were
high by national standards, and evidence both at the time and subsequently supports this view
(see Figure 3). After several attempts, the Michigan legislature passed major changes in WC in
1981, including comprehensive coordination of benefits, a restricted definition of disability, and
managed care as a way of containing medical costs (Hunt and Eccleston 1990). Also, as already
noted, the legislature adopted open competition in the setting of WC rates, which became
effective in 1983. These changes appear to have brought Michigan's WC costs closer to the
national average from about 1982 onward. Indeed, after an upward deviation during 1990–1992,
Michigan's costs appear to have been somewhat below the national average during the mid-1990s,
and the Oregon data suggest that Michigan remains close to average in WC costs.
Workers' Compensation and Workplace Safety
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws (1972) made
workplace safety one of the goals of WC. The WC system could improve workplace safety for at
least three reasons. First, if it is less costly for employers than for workers to take steps that
improve workplace safety, then WC improves workplace safety by placing the liability for
workplace injuries on the employer. [This is the case in theory as long as it is costly for workers
and employers to negotiate—that is, transaction costs exist (Butler 1999; Burton and Chelius
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1997).] Second, state WC agencies and WC insurance carriers (both private and public) provide
employers with loss prevention services, which may include safety consulting. Third, the
experience rating of WC premia creates a financial incentive for employers to takes steps that will
reduce workplace accidents and injuries.
A full discussion of workplace safety policy and the relative merits of WC versus safety
regulation is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, Burton and Chelius (1997) offer a
thorough review of the cases for and against government intervention through direct regulation (as
with the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970) and mandatory WC (which entails both
financial incentives and various methods of managing workplace risks). Research on OSHA has
not shown that direct regulation improves workplace safety, probably because the administrative
regulations that are enforced bear only a tangential relation to actual workplace risks. The
evidence on WC is more mixed. Research using data from the early 20th century suggests that
workplace death rates did fall after adoption of WC. However, research on whether experience
rating reduces injury rates suggests relatively small impacts—Burton and Chelius (1997)
conclude that experience rating "has had at least some role in improving safety for large firms."
Given that, in general, only large firms are experience rated at the level of the firm, this is hardly a
strong conclusion. Finally, the evidence on the effectiveness of expedients like mandatory safety
committees and meetings between workers and managers is difficult to interpret; often, such
measures are adopted along with other measures (like additional government safety inspections),
which makes it difficult to draw convincing conclusions. In short, much remains to be done to
understand the mix of policies that would deliver the optimal level of workplace safety.
Policy issues
Apart from privatization of its state fund, Michigan has made no major changes to its WC
system since the early 1980s, reflecting a long period of stable or declining costs along with
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benefits that were in line with those of neighboring states. The changes that have been made
pertain largely to confidentiality issues surrounding release of medical information. This period of
stability contrasts with many other states, which experienced sharply increased costs during the
1980s and early 1990s, along with rates that were held by state regulators below the rates needed
to cover those costs (Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton 2001, chapter 2). The combination of
higher costs and low regulated rates resulted in large losses for insurers and prompted many
private insurers to leave states where they had previously written WC policies. The result was a
series of state crises during the mid- and late-1990s in which employers, who were required to
obtain insurance, could not do so.
Michigan avoided such a "crisis" because its 1981 reforms had already moved the system
toward managed medical care, and because Michigan was among the early adopters of open
competition in setting WC rates. Moreover, injury rates fell during the 1990s (Ruser 1999).
These lower injury rates, combined with modest increases in medical costs and premia set by
competition, have created a relatively problem-free and stable environment for WC in Michigan
during the past 15 years.
The question in 2002 is whether this period of stability can continue in the face of
medical costs that are projected to rise dramatically in the future. Existing evidence suggests that
managed care has had a one-time effect on medical costs, and that those costs can be expected to
resume a growth rate that outpaces that of prices generally (Chernew et al. 1998). How the WC
system would respond to a resumption of high growth of medical costs is an open question.
From an economic standpoint, the appropriate response to an increase in the cost of injuries is
increased efforts to prevent injuries in the workplace, and the key for policy is to induce
employers and workers to create an appropriately greater level of workplace safety. However,
other responses can be imagined: attempts to restrict medical care, shifting costs to workers
46

through deductibles and copayments, and simply "absorbing" the increased costs (which would
likely have other consequences, such as reduced employment and output). It seems clear that
growth in medical benefits under WC is the most likely source of future controversy and policy
debate for Michigan's WC system.

Conclusions
UI, Michigan Works!, and WC are unique among Michigan's programs because they
replace lost earnings and deliver services to workers on a regular basis. Other programs that are
intended to improve the well-being of workers do so through regulation—for example, the
Michigan Department of Consumer and Industry Services oversees workplace conditions under
the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Michigan Department of Civil Rights
investigates complaints about employment discrimination. Each requires the commitment of
resources for administration, but none involves the payment of benefits or delivery of services to
workers on a regular basis.
Controversy is the norm for UI, Michigan Works!, and WC. UI has become increasingly
contentious in the wake of welfare reform and the first recession in a decade. The program's
critics offer various suggestions for reform that follow from different views of the program's
goals. Some see UI as an anti-poverty program; others see it primarily as social insurance. It is
not likely that the tension between these two views will be resolved soon.
Michigan Works! has faced similar tensions: Given limited resources, should the state
focus on providing second-chance training to disadvantaged workers or relatively inexpensive
reemployment services for job-ready workers? Is Michigan Works! providing the best possible
mix of services to assist workers in gaining employment?
WC has been relatively free of controversy during the past decade, but this period of
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relative calm may end soon as medical costs resume their rise. Workers' Compensation has faced
such pressures in the past and has managed to adjust, albeit after a significant lag. The main
conclusion drawn here is that the proper economic response to increased WC medical costs is an
effort to improve workplace safety, rather than measures such as restricting medical treatment or
cutting benefits.
Controversies over these programs should not obscure the fact that each has succeeded
over a period of decades in gaining widespread acceptance as essential to the efficient functioning
of the labor market. Arguments over the generosity of benefits and the appropriate extent of
training for disadvantaged workers are secondary compared with arguments from decades past
over whether these programs should even exist.
The challenge, however, is to ensure that these programs are returning benefits in relation
to the cost of the programs, and it is here that Michigan has been less progressive than other
states—notably Illinois and Wisconsin in the Midwest—that have acted on their own or
cooperated with the federal government to design and encourage research that could add to the
understanding of these programs and ultimately improve their operations. This is particularly
true of UI and reemployment programs, for which Michigan's debates have centered largely
around the views of political interests and have essentially neglected the broader perspective that
research could offer. A willingness to accept that a program may have flaws and that all the
answers do not already exist is an obvious prerequisite to admitting research as a component of
policy debate. Whether Michigan will, in the new millennium, be more receptive to the role of
research in debates over programs for workers is an open question.
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Table 1
UI Benefits in Michigan and Neighboring States, First Quarter 2002
State
Michigana
$82–112
($88–118)

Illinois
$51–56

Indiana
$50

Ohio
$85

Minimum duration of
benefits (weeks)

14
(15.5)

26

8

20

12

Earnings required for
minimum benefit

$2,997
($3,219)

$1,600

$2,750

$2,640

$1,590

$300
($362)

$296–431

$312

$308–414

$324

26

26

26

26

26

$10,976
($13,244)

$17,069

$29,200

$10,680

$9,390

Average weekly benefit
amount

$260

$286

$256

$254

$253

State average weekly wage

$714

$746

$603

$631

$600

Average weekly replacement
rate

36.5

38.3

42.5

40.3

42.2

$3,349

$4,787

$3,264

$3,400

$2,953

Average duration of benefits
(weeks)

13.3

16.3

12.9

14.4

12.2

Benefit exhaustion rate (%)

28.2

37.0

36.6

27.6

20.6

57.5

52.6

48.4

48.6

66.1

Minimum weekly benefit
amountb

Maximum weekly benefit
amountb
Maximum duration of
benefits (weeks)
Earnings required for
maximum benefit

Average benefits per
unemployment spell

c

Recipiency rate (%)

Wisconsin
$48

Notes: See text for discussion.
a
For Michigan, figures shown in parentheses indicate provisions that took effect with the April 2002
amendments to Michigan’s UI law.
b
Ranges shown for Illinois and Ohio are the result of dependents allowances, which vary with the number of
dependents.
c
The recipiency rate is the percentage of all unemployed workers receiving unemployment insurance
benefits (that is, the number of “insured unemployed” divided by the number of all unemployed workers,
stated as a percent).
Sources: Rows 1 through 6: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws
(2002) and author’s calculations. Rows 7 through 12: U.S. Department of Labor, “UI Data Summary” (2002).

Table 2
Separation and Nonseparation Eligibility for UI Benefits, Michigan and Neighboring States,
2002
Eligibility criteria
Separation
Voluntary leaving:
Only last separation
considered
Good cause restricted
to work-related issues
Additional reasons
allowed
Disqualification period
Earnings to requalify
Misconduct:
Last separation only
Disqualification period
(weeks)
Earnings to requalify
Benefits reduced
Added penalty for gross
misconduct
Nonseparation
Able and available for:
Full-time work
Suitable work
Usual work
Refusing suitable work:
Disqualification period
Benefits reduced

Michigan

Illinois

State
Indiana

no

no

yes

no

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

2

6

3

2

14

duration
7 x WBA
(12 x WBA)

duration
WBA in
4 weeks

duration
WBA in
8 weeks

duration
6 weeks
of work

duration
4 x WBA

no
duration

no
duration

yes
duration

no
duration

yes
duration

7 x WBA
(17 x WBA)
no
yes

WBA in
4 weeks
no
yes

WBA in
8 weeks
yes
yes

6 weeks
of work
no
yes

14 x WBA

yes
yes
yes

yes
no
no

yes
no
no

yes
yes
no

yes
no
no

6 weeks
(13 weeks)
yes

duration

duration

duration

duration

no

yes

no

no

a

Ohio

Wisconsin

yes
no

Notes: See text for discussion. “WBA” refers to weekly benefit amount; “duration” refers to disqualification for
the duration of the current unemployment spell.
a
For Michigan, figures shown in parentheses indicate provisions that took effect with the April 2002
amendments to Michigan’s UI law.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws (2002), UWC,
Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws (2002).

Table 3
UI Payroll Taxes and Program Solvency, Michigan and Neighboring States, First Quarter
2002
Michigan
$9,500
($9,000)

Illinois
$9,000

State
Indiana
$7,000

$32,487

$44,762

$18,214

$34,950

$16,561

$4,326

$5,493

$2,102

$4,876

$2,877

13.3

12.3

11.5

14.0

17.6

0.10 (0.06)
6.00 (6.30)

0.60
6.80

0.01
5.40

0.10
6.50

0.00
9.75

2.6
0.6

2.1
0.4

1.1
0.2

1.9
0.5

1.7
0.4

$982

$1,045

$222

$618

$446

$2,412

$1,109

$1,316

$1,852

$1,456

0.48
0.65

0.22
0.31

0.99
1.31

0.42
0.54

0.69
0.92

a

Taxable wage base
benefit amountb
Total wages of taxable
employers (in millions)
Taxable wages (in millions)
Taxable/total wages (%)
Statutory tax rates (%)
minimum
maximum
Average tax rate on:
taxable wages (%)
total wages (%)
UI tax revenues (last 12
(months, in millions)
Trust fund balance
(in millions)
High-cost multiple
Average high-cost multiple

Ohio
$9,000

Wisconsin
$10,500

Notes: See text for discussion.
a
For Michigan, figures shown in parentheses indicate changes that took effect in April 2002 under
amendments to Michigan’s UI law.
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws (2002a); U.S.
Department of Labor, “UI Data Summary” (2002b); author’s calculations.

Table 4
Employment and Training Legislation and the Changing Role of the Employment Service
Legislation
Wagner-Peyser Act (1933)

Implications for ES and reemployment policy
Creation of U.S. Employment Service; emphasis on
public labor exchange / placement services.

Social Security Act, Title III (1935)

Creation of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system;
ES to administer the UI work test.

Area Redevelopment Act (1961)

ES established training programs in depressed areas;
increased collection of labor market information.

Manpower Development and
Training Act (1962)

Further involvement of ES in training programs; reduced
emphasis on traditional placement services.

Economic Opportunity Act (1964)

ES provides outreach, screening, referral for
disadvantaged worker programs.

Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (1973)

Local provision of reemployment services as well as by
ES; fragmentation of reemployment services.

Job Training Partnership Act
(1982)

Continued local control of delivery of reemployment
services.

Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services (1993)

ES administers reemployment services under UI
profiling; return of emphasis on public labor exchange /
placement services.

Workforce Investment Act (1998)

ES becomes locus of One-Stop Centers.

Sources: Haber and Murray (1966); Bendick (1989); Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz (1995); Fagnoni
(2000).

Table 5
Funding for Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Worker Programs under the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), Michigan, 1993–2002
($1,000s)
Program year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Adult
35,740
31,310
30,084
21,942
20,890
21,705
19,568
24,943
21,550

Youth
56,099
56,040
46,366
25,358
29,769
29,069
23,367
25,958
26,136

Dislocated
workers
15,384
24,554
23,267
26,962
21,947
18,768
17,540
15,662
15,913

Total
107,223
111,904
99,717
74,262
72,606
69,542
60,475
66,562
63,599

Notes: Program Years run from July 1 of the preceding year through June 30 of the Program Year. The
summer youth program ended as a separate allocation at the end of Program Year 1999 (that is, June 30,
1999).
Source: Michigan Department of Career Development.

Table 6
Public Labor Exchange Applicants and Activities, Michigan, Neighboring States, and the United States, 1999
Michigan
572,305
11.2

Illinois
560,850
8.7

69.74
16.52
1.42
0.88
1.99

48.42
10.52
5.40
1.05
0.08

Percentage of all applicants receiving:
Assessment
Job search assistance
Training referral
Job referral
Job placement

1.36
12.26
0.69
2.30
0.87

Percentage of UI claimants receiving:
Assessment
Job search assistance
Training referral
Job referral
Job placement

0.26
2.17
0.21
0.31
0.09

Total applicants:
as % of labor force
Total applicants as % of:
UI claimants
Veterans
Disadvantaged
Disabled
Farm workers

State
Indiana
324,742
10.4

Ohio
774,218
12.7

Wisconsin
339,184
11.2

United States
16,708,228
11.9

28.12
13.46
17.59
4.45
0.01

34.35
15.12
55.66
2.6
0.25

24.92
8.57
0.79
7.25
0.23

36.9
10.0
12.9
2.0
1.1

1.81
38.54
2.48
29.77
11.15

3.11
50.26
3.07
34.36
6.50

3.04
76.15
1.06
35.80
13.0

4.28
5.53
0.27
57.89
9.95

10.64
40.13
2.37
40.30
10.60

0.35
9.66
0.92
13.73
3.22

0.46
36.46
1.58
7.80
4.89

3.08
84.90
1.27
26.37
5.70

7.88
12.25
0.61
58.52
13.32

10.70
39.38
2.82
26.80
5.83

Notes: See text for discussion.
Sources: U.S. Employment Service/America’s Labor Market Information System Program Report Data, Program Year 1999. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, May 2001; author’s calculations.

Table 7
Public Labor Exchange Applicants and Activities, Michigan and the United States,
1995 and 1999
1995

1999

U.S.
18,543
40.7
11.8
14.2
na
1.0

Michigan
655
22.2
12.2
na
na
1.7

U.S.
16,708
36.9
10.0
12.9
2.0
1.1

Michigan
572
69.7
16.5
1.4
0.9
2.0

Percentage of all applicants receiving:
Counseling
3.6
Job search assistance
26.8
Training referral
2.3
Job referral
43.0
Job placement
12.8

3.2
na
0.5
16.0
6.8

3.2
40.1
2.4
40.3
10.6

na
12.3
0.7
2.3
0.9

Total applicants (1,000s)
UI claimants (%)
Veterans (%)
Disadvantaged (%)
Disabled (%)
Farm workers (%)

Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, “U.S. Employment Service Annual Report: Program Report
Data” (Washington, DC: Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Employment Service,
reports for program years 1994 and 1999.

Table 8
Distribution of Workers’ Compensation Cases Involving Wage Replacement Benefits
by Type, United States, 1996–1998
Temporary benefits
(total and partial)
Permanent partial benefits
Permanent total benefits
(including death benefits)
Notes: See text for discussion.
Source: Mont et al. (2002).

Percentage
of cases
71

Percentage
of benefits
26

28

63

1

11

Table 9
Workers’ Compensation Benefits in Michigan and Neighboring States, 2002
WC Benefits
Medical benefits
Initial physician selection
Temporary total benefits:
Waiting period
Paid retroactively after
As % of worker's wage
Weekly minimum $
Weekly maximum $
As % of SAWWa
Maximum duration
Permanent total benefits:
As % of worker's wage
Weekly minimum $
Weekly maximum $
As % of SAWWa
Maximum duration
Permanent partial benefits:
Scheduled:
Hand
(maximum)
Eye
(maximum)
Non-scheduled:
As % of wage
Weekly minimum $
Weekly maximum $
As % of SAWWa
Maximum duration

Michigan
full
employer

Illinois
full
worker

State
Indiana
full
employer

7 days
2 weeks
80
(after-tax)
none

3 days
14 days
66.7

7 days
>21 days
66.7

101–124

50

644
90
none

956
133.3
none

80
(after-tax)
177
644
90
none

Ohio
90 daysb
employer

Wisconsin
full
worker

7 days
—
72 (12 weeks)
then 66.7
206

3 days
>7 days
66.7

508
na
500
weeks

618
100
none

582
100
none

66.7

66.7

66.7

66.7

357
956
133.3
none

50
508
na
500 weeks

309
618
100
none

30
582
100
none

215 weeks
($138,460)
162 weeks
($104,328)

190 weeks
($286,896)
160 weeks
($191,264)

$53,500

175 weeks
($108,150)
125 weeks
($77,250)

400 weeks
($73,600)
275 weeks
($50,600)

80
(after-tax)
179
644
90
none

60

66.7

na

66.7

81–97
516
na
none

none
508
na
none

none
618
100
none

30
184
66.7
1000
weeks

$43,500

30

Notes: See text for discussion.
SAWW is the State average weekly wage.
b
In Ohio, a worker must be examined by the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Section after 90
days of temporary total compensation to determine eligibility for continued treatment and compensation.
Source: Clifton, Grover, Lake, and Loomis (2001).
a

Table 10
Measures of Workers’ Compensation Costs in Michigan, Neighboring States, and the United States,
Various Years

Adjusted manual rate

Michigan
2.40

Illinois
2.62

2.69

2.80

State
Indiana
1.32

Ohio
2.89

Wisconsin
2.01

United States
2.26a

3.36

2.04

2.97b

(per $100 of payroll, 2000)
Adjusted manual rate

1.40

(per $100 of payroll, 1995)
a

Adjusted manual rate of the median state.
Weighted mean of all states.
Source: Row 1 from “Oregon Workers’ Compensation Premium Ranking,Calendar Year 2000” (Research and Analysis Section, Oregon
Department of Consumer and business Services, March 2001); row 2 from Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001, Tables C.17 and C.18).
b

Figure 1: Chargeable Benefit Component
(CBC) of the Michigan UI Payroll Tax
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Figure 2: Account Building Component
(ABC) of the Michigan UI Payroll Tax
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Figure 3
Adjusted Average Workers' Compensation Manual Rates, Michigan and the
United States, 1975–1995
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Source: Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001, Tables C.17 and C.18).
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